Fantastic article written on Wednesday by Bloomberg News Reporter Joe Mysak. Joe covers the municipal finance markets for Bloomberg. He has been on top of the drama for quite sometime now. You really need to check these Bloomberg reporters out on www.bloomberg.com because they know their stuff cold. Anyway, on with the show.
A article titled “Moody's, S&P Help Push Alabama County to Insolvency” really shows to paraphrase Hillary, “It takes a village to wreck a county’s finances.” A village of dullards, thieves and shiftless boobs. What really pisses me off is I pushed the idea that municipalities don’t default, certainly not on “essential purpose debt”, and I was wrong. Granted though, it takes a real concerted effort to bugger it all up on the part of everyone involved….but it can be done! From the Mr. Mysak’s article;
“Jefferson County, Alabama, the municipality that was going to teach America how to use swaps and derivatives, says it is running out of money and isn't sure it can pay its bills. And you can blame swaps and derivatives. While you're at it, you can also blame the subprime crisis, the downgrades of AAA rated bond insurers and the failure of Wall Street securities firms to backstop bond auctions. On Feb. 27, the county put out a material event notice regarding its $3.2 billion in sewer revenue warrants, saying it could `provide no assurance' that it could come up with the money needed to honor its obligations. `The County is working with its advisors to identify and analyze all feasible means to address the current difficult situation,' the notice said.”
Lets breakdown what happened here.
Jefferson County issued debt to be serviced by sewer revenues. Now, they could have issued fixed rate debt, meaning that the interest rate that drives the payment they must service is fixed. They could have done this for 30 years.
However, since someone in Jefferson County felt that sewer revenues must move in lock-step with short-term interest rates (I don’t think they do), they went down the yield curve where the rates were lower and issued floating rate debt. This is the whole Muni Auction Rate Debt you have been hearing about. You know, the auctions that are failing, causing municipal borrowers to pay double digit penalty rates? Yes those ones. Anyway, the first risk the county decided to take was interest rate risk by eschewing fixed rate debt for floating.
Now the real fun begins. The nice Wall Street firm that is “helping” Jefferson County says, “You know, you have a nice little arbitrage opportunity here. These floating rates you pay on the auction rate debt are a lot lower than 1m Libor (a short term rate that banks lend to each other.) You can ‘monetize’ this ‘arbitrage’ by entering into an interest rate swap with us. We pay you 1m Libor, you pay us a fixed rate, say 30yr Treasury +.5%. See, now you will take advantage of this great floating auction rate you are getting (because it is a law of nature that the auction rate will always be lower than 1m Libor right??) and get rid of the interest rate risk by paying us a fixed rate. All good?” So the second risk the county took was “basis risk” (the difference between the floating auction rate debt and 1 month Libor).
Now, if your not a derivatives professional, that might not be easy to understand. There is no shame in that. None at all. If this is not your full time profession its not easy to follow the flows. Let me ask a question though. Do you think the Jefferson County Treasurer could understand it? You think he knew that what started out as a simple debt raise for essential services turned into a trading position that would make the savviest derivatives pro’s hair fall out? Of course not. You think he even knew if he was getting a competitive market rate on the interest rate swap? You think that the treasurer at least put the swap dealer in comp? I can’t say yes or no but I can tell you that I have worked on a few derivative desks in my day and when one of these muni swap deals would come about, balloons and confetti would come falling out of the ceiling! “Chinese food for the whole trading floor courtesy of the swap desk…get involved!!!!!”
Anyway, it’s a complete disaster. Today the county was notified by the banks that it has the swaps on with to come up with $184mm to collateralize the mark to market loss the county has on the swaps. They have till……tomorrow! This is a case where
County officials got in way over their heads and took risk they didn’t even know they were taking.
The swap dealers took the county to the cleaners. According to Mr. Mysak’s piece, “In 2005, Bloomberg News found that the county was overcharged for swaps; last April, the new financial adviser said the county might have paid $100 million too much.” I did a bit of back of the envelope work and assuming 5bb of 30yr swaps, to “overpay” by $100mm the swaps would have to be about 14 basis points off market (0.0014). This is a market that trades in half basis points (0.00005)!!!
The rating agencies completely ignored or misunderstood what was going on in the county. Again quoting Joe’s article, “Not least among the culpable are the credit-rating companies. Jefferson County has piled on swaps and derivatives for years now, and yet this appears to be the first time that one of these companies has uttered a word about just how risky and speculative such a strategy has been. `Unique, risky structure'? How nice of Moody's, at long last, to acknowledge the problem. Couldn't they have said something, anything, last year? Or the year before?
And now Jefferson County is faced with the real possibility of default. How are they going to pay? How are they ever going to be able to borrow again? I really have no idea but there is gonna be a world of hurt for the folks in Jefferson County, as if they didn’t have enough problems to begin with. Like “Bunk” from “The Wire” says, “That is some shameful sh*t.”